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Abstract
I unravel the basic long run dynamics of the broker call money market,
which is the pile of cash that funds margin loans to retail clients (read: con-
tinuous time Kelly gamblers). Call money is assumed to supply itself perfectly
inelastically, and to continuously reinvest all principal and interest. I show that
the relative size of the money market (that is, relative to the Kelly bankroll)
is a martingale that nonetheless converges in probability to zero. The margin
loan interest rate is a submartingale that converges in mean square to the choke
price r∞ := ν − σ2/2, where ν is the asymptotic compound growth rate of the
stock market and σ is its annual volatility. In this environment, the gambler
no longer beats the market asymptotically a.s. by an exponential factor (as he
would under perfectly elastic supply). Rather, he beats the market asymptoti-
cally with very high probability (think 98%) by a factor (say 1.87, or 87% more
final wealth) whose mean cannot exceed what the leverage ratio was at the start
of the model (say, 2 : 1). Although the ratio of the gambler’s wealth to that
of an equivalent buy-and-hold investor is a submartingale (always expected to
increase), his realized compound growth rate converges in mean square to ν.
This happens because the equilibrium leverage ratio converges to 1 : 1 in lock-
step with the gradual rise of margin loan interest rates.
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“There are two sorts of wealth-getting, as I
have said; one is a part of household
management, the other is retail trade: the
former necessary and honorable, while that
which consists in exchange is justly
censured; for it is unnatural, and a mode by
which men gain from one another. The most
hated sort, and with the greatest reason, is
usury, which makes a gain out of money
itself, and not from the natural object of it.
For money was intended to be used in
exchange, but not to increase at interest.
And this term interest, which means the
birth of money from money, is applied to the
breeding of money because the offspring
resembles the parent.”
—Aristotle, Politics
“According to Laplace, the state of the
world at a given instant is defined by an
infinite number of parameters, subject to an
infinite number of differential equations. If
some universal mind could write down all
these equations and integrate them, it could
then predict with complete exactness,
according to Laplace, the entire evolution of
the world in the infinite future.”
—Andrey N. Kolmogorov
Long Run Feedback in the Broker Call Money Market A. Garivaltis
1 Introduction
This paper studies a system of stochastic differential equations that purports to ex-
press the iron laws of dynamical equilibrium behavior in the broker call money mar-
ket, a market that exists for the sake of funding stock brokers’ margin loans to retail
clients.
We assume that the (aggregate) demand side of the market is comprised of contin-
uous time Kelly (1956) gamblers. Kelly’s seminal (1956) article takes up the problem
of repeated bets on independent horse races for which the gambler has a better-quality
estimate of the win probabilities than does the bookie, whose beliefs are implicit in
the posted odds. The common-sense insight is that the (stationary) nature of the
problem dictates that the gambler should always bet a fixed fraction of his wealth
on this (favorable) opportunity; for obvious reasons, the Kelly fraction is chosen so
as to optimize the asymptotic continuously-compounded per-bet capital growth rate.
Leo Breiman (1961) demonstrated the competitively superior properties of the Kelly
Criterion: namely, that it asymptotically almost surely beats any “essentially differ-
ent” stratgy by an exponential factor; and it has the shortest mean waiting time for
hitting a distant wealth goal.
In our problem, each horse race has been replaced by a differential tick dt of the
market clock, whereby the stock market index St undergoes a fluctuation dSt that
determines the gambler’s profit-and-loss. Unlike betting on a horse race (where you
should not bet 100% of your wealth because you will eventually lose it all), it is highly
advisable, given a low enough margin loan interest rate, to bet more than 100% of
your wealth on every little movement of the stock market. To fix ideas, let us assume
that the S&P 500 index multiplies itself at an expected (logarithmic) rate of ν := 9%
a year, with σ := 15% annual (log-) volatility. If we were to imagine, in passing, that
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σ tends to zero, then it becomes clear by continuity considerations that we should be
falling all over ourselves in order to borrow money at a margin rate of, say, 5%.
In the context of leveraged investment, Kelly’s fixed fraction betting scheme implies
an ostensibly counter-intuitive trading mechanic. To illustrate, let us assume that we
have $100, and that we resolve to act so as to maintain a constant 2× level of exposure
to the S&P 500 index. This means that we must try to always maintain a margin
loan (debit) balance equal to the level of our account equity; the loan-to-value ratio
must always be 50%. Now, assume that we wake up tomorrow and the stock market
has gapped up 10%; our new account equity is $120︸︷︷︸
Equity
= $ 220︸︷︷︸
Assets
− $100︸︷︷︸
Liabilities
. Whatever
were our good reasons to lever the initial $100 twice over, it seems natural that they
should continue to apply to our newer, wealthier self. Note well that the market
has effectively chosen for us the new leverage ratio of 1.83 : 1, with a corresponding
loan-to-value ratio of 45.5%. Thus, our fixed-fraction betting scheme dictates that we
must borrow and invest an additional $20 (which is equal to the profits just earned).
Although this behavior gives off the optics of a trend-following, performance-chasing,
or market-timing scheme, the simple fact is that we are just going back to the well so
as to carry on exploiting the opportunity to borrow at a low price. To be clear, the
“trend” in question is the exponential growth of corporate earnings and dividends
that is manifest in the high drift rate of the log-price of the market index.
The flip side of the coin is that the gambler must unwind this very process when
the market goes down; for, suppose that on the next day, the index price gets divided
by a factor of 1.1 (for a loss of 9.1%), e.g. it returns full circle back to its original
level. Our portfolio assets have thereby dwindled in value to $240 ÷ 1.1 = $218.18
(against liabilities of $120), for a net equity of $98.18. Thus, the “sideways” motion
of the asset price has caused us to underperform a buy-and-hold investor; we have
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been “whipsawed” by the cold arithmetic of buying high and selling low. On that
score, our leverage ratio has just balooned to 2.22×, which makes for a loan-to-value
ratio of 55%. In order to remedy this (overlevered) situation, our scheme dictates
that we must liquidate $21.82 of assets, e.g. the amount of money that we just lost
in the fire.
This simple example makes it abundantly clear just what is the fundamental
trade-off that is faced by the continuous time Kelly gambler. On the one hand, we
expect to earn the spread between the margin loan interest rate and the compound
growth rate of the market index; on the other, we must deduct the ongoing costs of
the whipsaw effect, which become more pronounced with higher levels of volatility
in the underlying. The sweet spot that perfectly balances these two considerations
(check with David Luenberger 1998) amounts to the magic leverage ratio b∗ := 0.5 +
(ν − rL)÷ σ2, where rL is the margin loan interest rate.
If we assume that margin loans are supplied perfectly elastically (e.g. a horizontal
supply curve), then the continuous time Kelly gambler has access to a permanent
source of funding that allows him to beat the market asymptotically almost surely by
an exponential factor (cf. with Garivaltis 2019b). This “bucket shop”1 envrionment,
with its unlimited supply of Saps willing to provide cash to their betters for a song,
has obvious practical defects from a meta-perspective. Namely, on a long enough time
horizon, the Kelly gamblers must inevitably own every single dollar of stock market
capitalization.
Thus, in order to get a realistic equilibrium outcome, we have decided in this
paper to stand the supply curve on its head. The Saps, who are in possession of a
giant pool of call money, are now assumed to supply it perfectly inelastically at the
going rate (e.g. as determined by a vertical supply curve). Hapless though they are,
1A vivid expression that can be found in Merton (1992).
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they nonetheless manage to multiply their capital at an exponential rate; this paper
assumes that all principal and interest payments are continuously reinvested in the
money market.
How is this natural and straightforward market structure going to shake itself out
in the long run, given all the reverberatory effects of so many random vibrations in
the asset price? These pages contain the answer.
2 The Model
We assume that the stock market index or ETF has N shares outstanding, and its
price per share St evolves according to the geometric Brownian motion
dSt := St × (µ dt+ σ dWt), (2)
where S0 is the (given) initial price at time 0. Here, µ denotes the annual drift rate, σ
is the annual volatility, and Wt is a standard Brownian motion. The log-price evolves
according to (cf. Paul Wilmott 2001)
d(logSt) = ν dt+ σ dWt, (3)
where ν := µ− σ2/2 is the almost-sure asymptotic continuously-compounded capital
growth rate
ν = lim
t→∞
1
t
log
(
St
S0
)
=
E[d(logSt)]
dt
. (4)
We assume that, at every instant t, there is a quantity qt of loan money (“broker
call money”) that is supplied inelastically to the retail brokerage market. The money
market charges a continuously-compounded interest rate of rL(t) per year for the
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duration of the differential time step [t, t+ dt], where rL(t) will be determined below
in equilibrium. Naturally, we assume that the money market continuously reinvests
all proceeds (both principal and interest), and so the size of the money market evolves
according to
dqt := qt × rL(t)× dt, (5)
or
d(log qt) = rL(t)× dt, (6)
where q0 is exogenously given. Thus, we have the relation
qt = q0 × exp
{∫ t
0
rL(s)ds
}
. (7)
The demand side of the broker call money market is supposed to be constituted
by a (representative) continuous time Kelly (1956) gambler, that “bets” the fraction
bt ∈ [1,∞) of his wealth on the stock market for the differential time step [t, t + dt].
In so doing, since bt ≥ 1, he has borrowed the quantity qt := (bt − 1) × Vt from the
money market; the loan must be repaid (both principal and interest) “on call” at
time t+ dt. Starting from a given initial value of V0, the gambler’s fortune Vt evolves
according to the stochastic differential equation
dVt :=
bVt
St︸︷︷︸
number of shares
× dSt︸︷︷︸
profit/loss per share
− qt × rL(t)× dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
interest paid (=dqt)
= Vt × [{btµ+ (1− bt)rL(t)}dt+ btσ dWt].
(8)
Applying Itoˆ’s Lemma (cf. with Thomas Mikosch 1998) to the transformed process
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Vt 7→ log Vt, we see that the gambler’s log-fortune evolves according to
d(log Vt) =
{
btµ+ (1− bt)rL(t)− σ
2b2t
2
}
dt+ btσ dWt. (9)
The gambler’s expected continuously-compounded growth rate over [t, t+dt] is equal
to (cf. with David Luenberger 1998)
Γ(b, rL) := Growth Rate(b, rL) =
E[d(log Vt)]
dt
= rL + (µ− rL)b− σ
2
2
b2 . (10)
The Kelly bet (cf. with Edward O. Thorp2 2006, 2017) for the next tick of the market
clock (dt) is, by definition, the fraction of wealth that maximizes the growth rate:
bt = b
∗(rL) := arg max
b≥1
Γ(b, rL) =
µ− rL
σ2
=
1
2
+
ν − rL
σ2
. (11)
Note well that the maximized (instantaneous expected continuously-compounded)
growth rate is a stochastic process3 (Γt)t≥0 that fluctuates according to the prevailing
margin loan interest rate rL(t); substituting the Kelly bet (11) into the objective
function (10), we get the expressions
Γt := max
b≥1
Γ(b, rL(t)) = Γ(bt, rL(t))
= rL(t) +
1
2
[
µ− rL(t)
σ
]2
= rL(t) +
σ2b2t
2
.
(12)
2Who made a few such bets himself.
3The author is aware that this is an abuse of notation, albeit a very natural one that should
cause no confusion.
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We will require the fact that the process (Γt)t≥0 is bounded:
µ− σ2/2 ≤ Γt ≤ µ
2
2σ2
. (13)
The minorant µ − σ2/2 ≡ Γ(1, rL(t)) is the growth rate of an unlevered investor
(b := 1) who just buys the market index, and holds. The majorant µ2 ÷ (2σ2) is the
Kelly growth rate that obtains when the margin loan interest rate is zero. To put it
differently, we have
∂
∂rL
{
max
b≥1
Γ(b, rL(t))
}
= 1− µ− rL(t)
σ2
= 1− bt < 0. (14)
The instantaneous demand curve for margin loans is
qt =
(
µ
σ2
− 1
)
Vt − Vt
σ2
× rL(t). (15)
The corresponding instantaneous inverse demand curve is
rL = µ− σ2
(
1 +
qt
Vt
)
= µ− σ2 × bt, (16)
and the (price) elasticity of instantaneous demand for margin loans is
d(qt) := −rL(t)
qt
× dqt
drL(t)
=
(
µ
σ2
− 1
)
× Vt
qt
− 1. (17)
Since all qt dollars of call money are supplied inelastically by the money market, we
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have the vertical supply curve
Quantity Supplied :=

qt if rL(t) > 0
[0, qt] if rL(t) = 0.
(18)
Intersecting supply and demand, we get the equilibrium interest rate
rL(t) = max
(
µ− σ2 − σ2 × qt
Vt
, 0
)
= (µ− σ2[1 + qt/Vt])+, (19)
where µ − σ2 = ν − σ2/2 is the choke price of margin debt, and x+ := max(x, 0)
denotes the positive part of the number x. On account of the equilibrium price (19),
we get the formula
bt = min
(
1 +
qt
Vt
,
µ
σ2
)
. (20)
Thus, our dynamical model amounts to the following three assumptions:
(I.) All qt dollars of call money are supplied inelastically.
(II.) The broker call money market continuously reinvests all its interest dqt and
principal qt.
(III.) All margin loans are issued to continuous time Kelly gamblers; the loans pass
through costlessly from the money market, with no additional markup from
stock brokers.
To help visualize this environment, Figure 1 plots the supply and demand curves
for both t := 0 and t := 10 years later, along with the corresponding sample path
(qt, rL(t))0≤t≤10 in the price-quantity plane. The simulation (50,000 steps, ∆t :=
1.75 hours) used the parameter values (q0, V0, ν, σ) := (1, 1, 0.09, 0.15).
Lemma 1. The size of the money market relative to Kelly gamblers’ total equity has
9
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Figure 1: Random vibrations of the supply and demand for margin
loans over the course of a decade, as generated by the sample path
(qt, rL(t))0≤t≤10 in the price-quantity plane. The (50,000-step) simulation
used the parameter values (q0, V0, ν, σ) := (1, 1, 0.09, 0.15).
the following upper bound:
qt
Vt
≤ q0
V0
× exp
(
− σ
2t
2
− σ
∫ t
0
bsdWs
)
. (21)
Thus, the margin loan interest rate is bounded from below by the expression:
rL(t) ≥ µ− σ2
{
1 +
q0
V0
exp
(
− σ
2t
2
− σ
∫ t
0
bsdWs
)}
. (22)
Proof. First, we note the fact that qt ≤ q0 × e(µ−σ2)t, e.g. the call money market can
never compound its money any faster than the choke price µ−σ2. That is, looking at
the interest rate expression (19), we have the upper bound rL(t) ≤ µ−σ2; juxtaposing
this inequality with the integral (7) yields qt ≤ q0× exp{(µ− σ2)t}, as promised. On
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the other hand, the gambler’s fortune is bounded below by the quantity
Vt ≥ exp
{
(µ− σ2/2)t+ σ
∫ t
0
bsdWs
}
. (23)
For, looking at the differential equation (9), and bearing in mind that Γt ≥ µ− σ2/2,
we have
d(log Vt) = Γt dt+ btσ dWt ≥ (µ− σ2/2) dt+ btσ dWt (24)
=⇒ log(Vt/V0) ≥ (µ− σ2/2)t+ σ
∫ t
0
bsdWs. (25)
Combining the majorant qt ≤ q0 × e(µ−σ2)t with the minorant (23) for Vt, we get the
stated result (21).
In plain language, Lemma 1 says that the locally expected growth rate of the
gambler’s fortune always exceeds the expected growth rate of the market index; on
the other hand, the compound growth rate of the broker call money market (at most
µ − σ2) is expected to be lower than that of the market index. To be sure, the
actual dynamics of the relative market size (qt/Vt)t≥0 is ultimately determined by
the realized path (Wt)t≥0 of the Brownian motion that drives all uncertainty in the
economy. But based on the expected difference in the exponential growth rates of Vt
and qt, it is clear that after the elapse of many years (read: decades or centuries), the
chances are high that the aggregate quantity of call money will be small in relation
to the total bankrolls of continuous time Kelly gamblers.
Theorem 1. The size of the broker call money market relative to Kelly gamblers’
total equity converges in probability4 to zero:
plim
t→∞
qt
Vt
= 0. (26)
4It emphatically does not converge in mean square, as we will show below.
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Thus, the leverage ratio of Kelly gamblers converges in probability to 1 (b∞ := plimt→∞ bt =
1) and the margin loan interest rate converges in probability5 to the choke price:
r∞ := plim
t→∞
rL(t) = µ− σ2 = ν − σ
2
2
. (27)
The growth rate process Γt converges in probability to the buy-and-hold growth rate:
plim
t→∞
Γt = ν = µ− σ2/2. (28)
Proof. Since the Kelly bet bt = min(1 + qt/Vt, µ/σ
2) is a continuous function of the
ratio qt/Vt, and the interest rate rL(t) = µ−σ2bt is in turn a continuous function of bt,
it suffices to show that qt/Vt converges in probability to 0, since probability limits are
preserved by continuous transformations. There follows plimt→∞ Γt = Γ(1, µ− σ2) =
µ− σ2/2.
Thus, let  be any positive real number. Applying Lemma 1, we get the relations
1 ≥ Prob
{
qt
Vt
≤ 
}
≥ Prob
{
−1
t
∫ t
0
bsdWs − log(V0/q0)
σt︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Xt
≤ σ
2
}
→ 1 as t→∞.
(29)
That is, note that the process Xt := −t−1
{ ∫ t
0
bsdWs + log(V0/q0)/σ
}
converges to
zero in mean square: we have
lim
t→∞
E[Xt] = lim
t→∞
− log(V0/q0)
σt
= 0 (30)
and, combining the Itoˆ isometry (cf. Tomas Bjo˝rk 1998) with the bound 1 ≤ bs ≤
5Since the processes bt and rL(t) are bounded (1 ≤ bt ≤ µ/σ2 and 0 ≤ rL(t) ≤ µ− σ2), they do
indeed converge in mean square to 1 and µ− σ2, respectively. The ratio qt/Vt has no such bounds;
it may take any value in (0,+∞).
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µ/σ2, we get
Var[Xt] =
1
t2
∫ t
0
E[b2s]ds ≤
µ2
σ4t
→ 0, (31)
so that limt→∞Var[Xt] = 0. Since the process (Xt)t≥0 converges to zero in mean
square, it certainly converges to zero in probability; in particular, this means that
lim
t→∞
Prob
{
Xt ≤ σ
2
}
= 1. (32)
By the squeeze theorem, then, we have obtained the desired result: for all  > 0,
lim
t→∞
Prob
{
qt
Vt
≤ 
}
= 1. (33)
Corollary 1. The margin loan interest rate rL(t) converges in mean square to the
choke price r∞ := µ−σ2 = ν−σ2/2 and the Kelly bet bt converges in mean square to 1.
The instantaneous Kelly growth rate Γt converges in mean square to the buy-and-hold
growth rate ν = µ− σ2/2.
Proof. It suffices to show that bt converges in mean square to 1; then, on account of
the linear relationship rL(t) = µ − σ2bt, we will have limt→∞ E[rL(t)] = µ − σ2 and
limt→∞Var[rL(t)] = 0.
To this end, let  be any positive number, and let Rt := qt/Vt denote the relative
size of the call money market. We have
E[(bt − 1)2] = Prob{Rt < }E[(bt − 1)2|Rt < ] + Prob{Rt ≥ }E[(bt − 1)2|Rt ≥ ]
≤ 1× 2 + Prob{Rt ≥ } × (µ/σ2 − 1)2.
(34)
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Using the fact that limt→∞ Prob{Rt ≥ } = 0, we see that the following relation must
obtain for every  > 0:
lim sup
t→∞
E[(bt − 1)2] ≤ 2. (35)
Since the lim supt→∞ of the mean-squared error is smaller than every positive number,
we get the inequalities
lim inf
t→∞
E[(bt − 1)2] ≤ lim sup
t→∞
E[(bt − 1)2] = 0 ≤ lim inf
t→∞
E[(bt − 1)2], (36)
which implies that limt→∞ E[(bt − 1)2] = 0.
Finally, turning our attention to the instantaneous Kelly growth rate Γt = rL(t)+
σ2b2t/2, it now suffices to show that b
2
t converges to 1 in mean square; then, since
rL(t)
m.s.−−→ µ − σ2, we will have Γt m.s.−−→ µ − σ2 + σ2/2 × 1 = µ − σ2/2, as promised.
Accordingly, we bound the mean-squared error
E[(b2t − 1)2] = E[(bt − 1)2(bt + 1)2] ≤ E[(bt − 1)2]×
(
µ
σ2
+ 1
)2
→ 0, (37)
which proves that b2t
m.s.−−→ 1.
In plain English: as time goes on, there are some (exceedingly rare) sample paths
of the experiment whereby the Kelly gambler performs very poorly in relation to
the money market; the ratio qt/Vt therefore spikes and the Kelly bet hits the upper
bound bt = µ/σ
2 under an interest rate of zero. However, these rare events make a
negligible contribution to the mean-squared error E[(bt − 1)2], precisely because the
Kelly gambler’s mantra prevents him from betting more than b := µ/σ2, even when
he is offered an interest rate of zero. After many years t have elapsed, the density
of bt becomes concentrated around 1, albeit with a long tail that spans the interval
[1, µ/σ2].
14
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Figure 2: 100-year sample path of the Kelly leverage ratios (bt) and
corresponding margin loan interest rates (rL(t)), for the parameters
(q0, V0, ν, σ, µ, r∞) := (1, 1, 0.09, 0.15, 0.1012, 0.0787). The means and standard
deviations were estimated from 50, 000 Monte Carlo simulations of
50, 000 steps each (∆t := 17.5 hours).
Figure 2 illustrates the corollary by plotting a 100-year, 50,000-step sample path
of the Kelly leverage ratios and margin loan interest rates in an economy generated by
the parameters (q0, V0, ν, σ, µ, r∞) := (1, 1, 0.09, 0.15, 0.1012, 0.0787). For context, the
Figure provides Monte Carlo estimates of the expected values {E[bt],E[rL(t)]}0≤t≤100
and standard deviations {Std(bt), Std(rL(t))}0≤t≤100 that were generated from 50, 000
simulations of 50, 000 steps each (∆t := 17.5 hours). In the same vein, Figure 3
gives a 30-year sample path of the instantaneous growth rate process (Γt) for the
same parameters, along with Monte Carlo estimates of the functions t 7→ E[Γt] and
t 7→ Std(Γt) that were computed from 40, 000 simulations (∆t := 6.6 hours).
Theorem 2. The relative size qt/Vt of the money market is a martingale (in spite of
the fact that it converges in probability to zero); the Kelly bet bt is a supermartingale
(e.g. it is always expected to decrease) and the margin loan interest rate rL(t) is a
submartingale (e.g. it is always expected to increase).
15
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Figure 3: 30-year sample path of the optimum growth rate process
(Γt) for the parameters (q0, V0, ν, σ) := (1, 1, 0.09, 0.15), along with Monte
Carlo estimates (40, 000 simulations, ∆t := 6.6 hours) of the functions
t 7→ E[Γt] and t 7→ Std(Γt).
Proof. We apply the quotient rule of the Itoˆ calculus (cf. with Ovidiu Calin 2015) to
the ratio qt/Vt:
d
(
qt
Vt
)
=
dqtVt − qtdVt − dqtdVt
V 2t
+
qt
V 3t
× (dVt)2. (38)
According to the Itoˆ multiplication table (e.g. Paul Wilmott 1998), we have dqt ×
dVt = 0 and (dVt/Vt)
2 = b2tσ
2 × dt. Thus, one calculates that
d
(
qt
Vt
)
=
qt
Vt
×
[
(rL + b
2
tσ
2)dt− dVt
Vt
]
=
qt
Vt
×
[
bt(σ
2bt − µ+ rL(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
)dt− btσ dWt
]
= −σqtbt
Vt
dWt.
(39)
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Thus, the stochastic process (qt/Vt)t≥0 is a martingale, since it has zero drift and
admits the (Itoˆ) integral representation
qt
Vt
=
q0
V0
− σ
∫ t
0
qsbs
Vs
dWs. (40)
On account of the fact that bt = min(1 + qt/Vt, µ/σ
2) is a concave function of the
martingale qt/Vt, we conclude that (bt)t≥0 is a supermartingale, e.g. it is always
expected to decrease (cf. with Lawrence Evans 2010). Likewise, the interest rate
rL(t) = max(µ − σ2 − σ2qt/Vt, 0) is a submartingale, since it is a convex function of
a martingale.
Thus, although the chances are high that the ratio Rt := qt/Vt is very low in the
long run, it nevertheless has a constant mean E[Rt] ≡ q0/V0; this happens on account
of a few sample paths for which the stock market dramatically underperforms the
broker call money market. The (unconditionally) expected interest rate E[rL(t)] is an
increasing function of time that converges to µ− σ2; conditional on the current state
of things at time t, the expected margin rate E[rL(t + ∆t)|rL(t)] at any time in the
future is greater than or equal to the current observation rL(t). However, the expected
increases in the interest rate (and attendant decreases in the aggregate leverage ratio)
are disturbed by so many random vibrations of the stock market. The margin loan
interest rate responds pro-cyclically to random noise in the financial markets; the
leverage ratios of continuous time Kelly gamblers respond counter-cyclically. But the
underlying signal (that is, the exponential growth of asset prices) suffices to generate
a permanent uptrend in margin loan interest rates.
Corollary 2. The probability of the margin loan interest rate ever hitting zero (be-
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tween now and kingdom come) has the following majorant:
Prob{rL(t) is ever 0} ≤ 1− rL(0)
r∞
= 1− Current Interest Rate
Choke Price
(41)
Proof. The condition that the margin loan interest rate rL(t) hits zero at least once
over a given horizon [0, T ] is equivalent to the condition that the ratio qt/Vt breaches
µ/σ2 − 1 at least once. Since (qt/Vt)t≥0 is a positive martingale, Doob’s martingale
inequality obtains (cf. Lawrence Evans 2010); in our context, this inequality amounts
to
Prob
{
max
0≤t≤T
qt
Vt
≥ µ
σ2
− 1
}
≤ E[qT/VT ]
µ/σ2 − 1 =
q0
V0
× σ
2
µ− σ2 = 1−
rL(0)
r∞
, (42)
where we have used the fact that E[qT/VT ] ≡ q0/V0. Taking the limit of the inequality
(42) as T →∞, we obtain the desired result, that
Prob
{
sup
t≥0
qt
Vt
≥ µ
σ2
− 1
}
≤ 1− rL(0)
r∞
. (43)
Thus, if the current margin loan interest rate amounts to 70% of the choke price,
then the chance of it ever hitting zero is at most 30%. If the current rate is 20% of the
asymptotic interest rate, then the chance of it ever reaching zero is at most 80%, etc.
Table 1 illustrates the majorant for different stock market volatilities and compound-
annual (logarithmic) growth rates, assuming that the money market begins on par
with the gambler’s fortune (q0/V0 := 1). Naturally, the bound becomes tighter as the
stock market parameters become more favorable (higher ν, lower σ); it also tightens
with the relative scarcity of loanable funds (lower q0/V0).
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Example 1. As of this writing, the broker call money rate (as reported by Bankrate.com)
is 4.25%. Assuming the stylized parameters (ν, σ) := (0.09, 0.15) for the S&P 500 in-
dex, we get a choke price of 7.9%. Thus, we reckon that the chance of the margin
loan interest rate ever hitting zero is at most 4.25÷ 7.9 = 54%.
Proposition 1. We have the following bounds on the (unconditional) standard devi-
ation of the relative market size qt/Vt:
q0
V0
×
√
exp[σ2t]− 1 ≤ Std
(
qt
Vt
)
≤ q0
V0
×
√
exp[(µ/σ)2t]− 1. (44)
In particular, limt→∞ Std(qt/Vt) = +∞.
Proof. For notational convenience, we let F (t) := E[(qt/Vt)2] denote the second mo-
ment of the relative size process. Recalling the (Itoˆ) integral representation
qt
Vt
=
q0
V0
− σ
∫ t
0
qsbs
Vs
dWs, (45)
the Itoˆ isometry implies that
Var
[
qt
Vt
]
= F (t)− (q0/V0)2 = σ2
∫ t
0
E
[(
qsbs
Vs
)2]
ds, (46)
which, upon differentiating, gives us
dF
dt
= σ2E
[(
qtbt
Vt
)2]
. (47)
Now, bearing in mind that 1 ≤ b2t ≤ µ2/σ4, we have the inequalities
σ2F (t) ≤ dF
dt
≤
(
µ
σ
)2
F (t), (48)
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or equivalently,
σ2 ≤ d
dt
logF (t) ≤
(
µ
σ
)2
. (49)
Integrating the inequalities (49) and simplifying, we obtain the theoretical bounds
F (0)× {exp[σ2t]− 1} ≤ F (t)− F (0) ≤ F (0)× {exp[(µ/σ)2t]− 1}. (50)
Remembering that F (0) = (q0/V0)
2 and Var[qt/Vt] = F (t)− F (0), taking the square
root of (50) yields the stated result.
Thus, although the martingale (qt/Vt)t≥0 converges in probability to zero, its stan-
dard deviation grows to infinity at a geometric rate. Figure 4 plots these theoretical
bounds, along with Monte Carlo estimates of the true standard deviation, for t ∈ [0, 2]
assuming the parameters q0 := 1, V0 := 1, ν := 0.09, σ := 0.15, and µ := ν + σ
2/2 =
0.1012. The (deterministic) function t 7→ Std(qt/Vt) was estimated from 100, 000 ex-
periments of 100, 000 steps each; the corresponding step size was ∆t := 10.5 minutes.
Note that the population standard deviation
√
E[(qt/Vt)2]− (q0/V0)2 is required to be
increasing on account of the fact that the process (qt/Vt)
2 is a submartingale (e.g. it
is a convex function of qt/Vt). For the sake of visualization, Figure 5 plots a 100-year
sample path of qt/Vt for the same deep parameters (q0, V0, ν, σ) := (1, 1, 0.09, 0.15);
the experiment consisted of 100, 000 steps, for a step size of 8.8 hours.
Theorem 3. The Kelly gambler’s realized continuously-compounded capital growth
rate over [0, T ] (namely, log(VT/V0)/T ) converges in mean square to the stock market
growth rate ν = µ − σ2/2; the realized continuously-compounded growth rate of the
money market over [0, T ] (namely, log(qT/q0)/T ) converges in mean square to the
choke price r∞ = ν − σ2/2 = µ− σ2.
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Ratio Vol. CAGR Current/Choke Majorant Actual Prob.
(q0 ÷ V0) (σ) (ν) (rL(0)/r∞) of P{rL is ever 0} (Monte Carlo est.*)
1 10% 9% 7.5%/8.5% ≤11.8% 9.3%
(0.18%)
1 15% 9% 5.6%/7.9% ≤28.6% 26.3%
(0.28%)
1 20% 9% 3%/7% ≤57.1% 55.1%
(0.31%)
1 10% 8% 6.5%/7.5% ≤13.3% 10.8%
(0.2%)
1 15% 8% 4.6%/6.9% ≤32.8% 30.1%
(0.29%)
1 20% 8% 2%/6% ≤66.7% 63.8%
(0.3%)
1 10% 7% 5.5%/6.5% ≤15.4% 12.7%
(0.21%)
1 15% 7% 3.6%/5.9% ≤38.3% 36.1%
(0.3%)
1 20% 7% 1%/5% ≤80% 78%
(0.26%)
1 10% 6% 4.5%/5.5% ≤18.2% 15.2%
(0.23%)
1 15% 6% 2.6%/4.9% ≤46.2% 43.6%
(0.31%)
1 20% 6% 0%/4% ≤100% 100%
1 10% 5% 3.5%/4.5% ≤22.2% 18.7%
(0.25%)
1 15% 5% 1.6%/3.9% ≤58.1% 56%
(0.31%)
1 20% 5% 0%/3% ≤100% 100%
Table 1: Upper bounds on the probability of the margin loan interest rate ever
hitting zero over t ∈ [0,+∞), for different stock market volatilities and growth
rates, assuming that the money market starts on par with the gambler’s fortune
(q0/V0 := 1).
*Percentage of all simulations for which the margin loan interest rate hit the
zero bound (standard errors in parentheses). 25, 000 simulations per estimate,
spanning 200 years each, 25, 000 steps per simulation, ∆t := 2.92 days.
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Figure 4: Monte Carlo estimates of Std(qt/Vt) over t ∈ [0, 2], assuming the
parameters q0 := 1, V0 := 1, ν := 0.09, σ := 0.15, and µ := ν + σ
2/2 = 0.1012.
Estimates computed from the simulation of 100, 000 sample paths of
100, 000 steps each (∆t := 10.5 minutes).
Proof. On account of the expresstion
log(qT/q0)
T
=
1
T
∫ T
0
rL(t)dt, (51)
it follows that
E
[
log(qT/q0)
T
]
=
1
T
∫ T
0
E[rL(t)]dt (52)
is the average value of the (deterministic) function t 7→ E[rL(t)] over the interval [0, T ].
Since rL(t) converges in mean square to r∞, we have the relation limt→∞ E[rL(t)] =
r∞; thus, the average value of the function t 7→ E[rL(t)] must also converge to r∞. It
remains to show that
lim
T→∞
Var
[
log(qT/q0)
T
]
= 0. (53)
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Figure 5: 100-year sample path of qt/Vt, generated by the parameters
q0 := 1, V0 := 1, ν := 0.09, σ := 0.15, and µ := ν + σ
2/2 = 0.1012. 100,000 steps,
step size = 8.8 hours. Crossing the blue (dashed) barrier results in a
margin loan interest rate of zero.
To this end, we invoke the formula (cf. with Hoel, Port, and Stone 1972)
Var
[
log(qT/q0)
T
]
=
1
T 2
∫ T
0
∫ T
0
Cov(rL(s), rL(t))dsdt. (54)
The Cauchy-Schwarz inequality (e.g. check with T.T. Soong 1973) says that
Cov(rL(s), rL(t)) ≤ Std(rL(s))× Std(rL(t)). (55)
Hence, since the right-hand-side of (55) is multiplicatively separable in the variables
s and t, the double integral (54) is majorized by the square of the unidimensional
integral
∫ T
0
Std(rL(t))dt; this gives us the variance bound
Var
[
log(qT/q0)
T
]
≤
[
1
T
∫ T
0
Std(rL(t))dt
]2
→ 0 as T →∞. (56)
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The right-hand-side of (56) converges to zero as T → ∞ because it is the average
value of the (deterministic) function t 7→ Std(rL(t)), which itself converges to zero
on account of the fact that rL(t) converges in mean square to r∞. This proves that
the realized money market growth rate log(qT/q0)/T converges in mean square to the
choke price r∞ = µ− σ2.
Turning our attention to the realized compound-growth rate of the Kelly bankroll
over 0 ≤ t ≤ T , we integrate the left-hand-side of (24) and obtain the expression
log(VT/V0)
T
=
1
T
∫ T
0
Γt dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:xT
+
σ
T
∫ T
0
btdWt︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:yT
=: xT + yT . (57)
Bearing in mind that E[yT ] ≡ 0, we get
E
[
log(VT/V0)
T
]
= E[xT ] =
1
T
∫ T
0
E[Γt]dt, (58)
which is the average value of the deterministic function t 7→ E[Γt] over the interval
[0, T ]. Since the stochastic process (Γt)t≥0 converges in mean square to µ− σ2/2, we
of course have limt→∞ E[Γt] = µ − σ2/2; accordingly, the average value (58) of the
function t 7→ E[Γt] must also converge to µ− σ2/2 as T →∞.
To complete the proof, we proceed to demonstrate that that limT→∞Var[xT+yT ] =
0. On account of the triangle inequality Std(xT + yT ) ≤ Std(xT ) + Std(yT ), it suffices
to show that limT→∞Var[xT ] = 0 and limT→∞Var[yT ] = 0. We are already familiar
with the fact that yT converges to zero in mean square; mutatis mutandis, analogous
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to what we just did with the interest rate rL(t), we write
Var
[
1
T
∫ T
0
Γtdt
]
=
1
T 2
∫ T
0
∫ T
0
Cov(Γs,Γt)dsdt
≤ 1
T 2
[ ∫ T
0
Std(Γs)ds
][ ∫ T
0
Std(Γt)dt
]
=
[
1
T
∫ T
0
Std(Γt)dt
]2
→ 0.
(59)
The last bracketed expression in (59) converges to 0 as T → ∞ because it is the
average value of the function t 7→ Std(Γt) over the interval [0, T ], a function whose
value itself converges to 0 as t→∞.
To illustrate the Theorem, Figure 6 plots the realized growth rate series
1
t
(log(qt/q0), log(St/S0), log(Vt/V0)) (60)
that obtained from a 200-year, 200,000-step simulation of the model economy gener-
ated by the parameters (q0, V0, ν, σ) := (1, 1, 0.09, 0.15).
Theorem 4 (Change of Nume´raire). The ratio Vt/St of the gambler’s fortune to the
price of one unit of the market index (e.g. the value of the bankroll as measured
in shares of the ETF) is a submartingale (always expected to increase). The total
size qt/St of the money market, as expressed in units of this nume´raire, is a super-
martingale that converges in probability to zero. The aggregate wealth in the model
(qt+Vt)/St (money market plus gambler’s equity) is a supermartingale when expressed
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Figure 6: The realized continuously-compounded capital growth rates
in a 200-year, 200,000-step simulation of the model economy, under
the parameters (q0, V0, ν, σ) := (1, 1, 0.09, 0.15).
in shares of the market index. Consequently, the ratio
Kelly Gambler’s Relative Growth Factor :=
Vt/V0
St/S0
(61)
has the property that
E
[
Vt/V0
St/S0
]
≤ 1 + q0
V0
for all t. (62)
The relative growth factor (Vt/V0) ÷ (St/S0) amounts to the ratio of the Kelly
gambler’s bankroll to the wealth of a buy-and-hold investor (b ≡ 1) who started with
the same initial capital. Note that, although the cumulative outperformance realized
by the Kelly gambler over [0, t] is always expected to increase, it fails to grow to
infinity at an exponential rate (as it would under perfectly elastic supply of margin
loans). Rather, the asymptotic relative growth factor is a finite, random quantity
that may even turn out to be less than 1 (albeit with low probability). At the start of
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the model, the Kelly gambler cannot expect to ever achieve more than 1+q0/V0 times
the wealth of a buy-and-hold investor who started with the same amount of money.
Say, if the initial interest rate is positive and the initial leverage ratio is b0 := 2 (the
maximum allowed by U.S. Regulation-T), then we cannot expect to achieve more
than double the final wealth of an equivalent buy-and-hold investor.
Proof. Applying the Itoˆ quotient rule to the process (Vt/St)t≥0, one calculates that
d
(
Vt
St
)
=
Vt
St
×
{
(bt − 1)(µ− σ2 − rL(t))dt+ σ(bt − 1)dWt
}
. (63)
Thus, (Vt/St)t≥0 is a submartingale because of its positive drift, which obtains on
account of the fact that bt > 1 and rL < µ− σ2. A similar calculation shows that
d
(
qt
St
)
=
qt
St
×
{
− (µ− σ2 − rL(t))dt− σdWt
}
, (64)
whence (qt/St)t≥0 is a supermartingale because of its negative drift rate. Combining
equations (63) and (64), and simplifying, we obtain
d
(
qt + Vt
St
)
= d
(
qt
St
)
+d
(
Vt
St
)
=
(bt − 1)Vt − qt
St
{
(µ−σ2−rL(t))dt+σdWt
}
. (65)
Recalling that bt = min(1 + qt/Vt, µ/σ
2) ≤ 1 + qt/Vt, we see that (qt + Vt)/St is
a supermartingale, since its drift is ≤ 0. With these facts in hand, we have the
inequalities
E
[
Vt
St
]
≤ E
[
qt + Vt
St
]
≤ q0 + V0
S0
, (66)
where we have used the fact that E[(qt + Vt)/St] is a decreasing function of time.
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Multiplying (66) through by S0/V0, we get the promised result:
E
[
Vt/V0
St/S0
]
≤ 1 + q0
V0
. (67)
Finally, for the sake of demonstrating that plimt→∞ qt/St = 0, we start with the upper
bound
qt
St
≤ q0
S0
× exp
(
− σ
2t
2
+ σWt
)
; (68)
If  is any positive number, then
Prob
{
qt
St
≤ 
}
≥ Prob
{
q0
S0
exp
(
− σ
2t
2
+ σWt
)
≤ 
}
= Prob
{
Wt√
t
≤ log(S0/q0)
σ
√
t
+
σ
√
t
2
}
= N
(
log(S0/q0)
σ
√
t
+
σ
√
t
2
)
,
(69)
where N(•) denotes the cumulative normal distribution function. Thus, we have
1 ≥ lim
t→∞
Prob
{
qt
St
≤ 
}
≥ N(∞) = 1, (70)
which is the desired result.
Figure 7 supplements Theorem 4 by plotting a 100-year (100, 000-step) sam-
ple path of the time series Vt/St, qt/St, (qt + Vt)/St, and rL(t) for the parameters
(q0, V0, ν, σ) := (1, 1, 0.08, 0.2). For this particular simulation (∆t := 8.8 hours), we
made the stock market index less favorable than it was in our previous experiments
(lower ν, higher σ) so as to highlight the model’s behavior when the margin loan
interest rate hits zero very frequently on its way up to r∞. To help visualize the
population statistics under this change of nume´raire, Figure 8 provides a 300-year
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Figure 7: 100-year sample path of the stochastic processes Vt/St, (qt +
Vt)/St, qt/St, and rL(t) for the parameters (q0, V0, ν, σ) := (1, 1, 0.08, 0.2).
100, 000 steps, ∆t := 8.8 hours.
plot of the time functions E[Vt/St]±Std(Vt/St),E[qt/St], and E[(qt +Vt)/St] for these
same parameters.
Figure 9 gives a density estimate (Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth := 0.0193)
for the random variable ms-limt→∞[(Vt/V0)÷ (St/S0)], based on 100, 000 simulations
generated by the parameters (q0, V0, ν, σ) := (1, 1, 0.09, 0.15). For these sample paths,
on average, the Kelly gambler achieved a relative growth factor of 1.87, or 87% more
final wealth than the equivalent buy-and-hold investor. Note that the Kelly Criterion
underperformed buy-and-hold on 2.1% of all sample paths (cf. the asymptotic CDF,
which is supplied in the right half of the Figure).
3 Summary and Conclusions
This paper established the core dynamical behavior of the broker call money market,
which supplies cash to stock brokers for the sake of funding margin loans to retail
clients. We assumed (naturally) that the demand side of the market is comprised
of continuous time Kelly gamblers, who size their bets over each tick dt of the clock
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Figure 8: 300-year plot of the population statistics E[Vt/St] ±
Std(Vt/St),E[qt/St],and E[(qt+Vt)/St] under change of nume´raire, assuming
the parameters (q0, V0, ν, σ) := (1, 1, 0.08, 0.2).
so as to maximize their expected continuously-compounded capital growth rate over
[t, t+dt]. Ordinarily, under perfectly elastic supply of margin loans (cf. with Garivaltis
2019a), the Kelly gambler is able to beat the market asymptotically almost surely,
and by an exponential factor to boot.
To model the powerful long run feedback effects that these sophisticated investors
must have on the equilibrium price of margin debt, we assumed that the production
side of market amounts to a giant pool of cash that supplies itself inelastically and
continuously reinvests all principal and interest. Thus, although the total size of the
money market (qt) grows to infinity at a geometric rate, this rate of supply expansion
is lower than the asymptotic growth rate ν of the market index (St) and the expected
compound growth rate of the Kelly bankroll (Vt). Proceeding with this intuition,
we found that the relative market size (qt/Vt)t≥0 is a martingale (whose variance
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Figure 9: Empirical distribution of the random variable
ms-limt→∞[(Vt/V0) ÷ (St/S0)], based on 100,000 simulations generated
by the parameters (q0, V0, ν, σ) := (1, 1, 0.09, 0.15). Epanechnikov kernel
bandwidth := 0.0193; the Kelly Criterion underperformed buy-and-
hold on 2.1% of all sample paths.
tends to infinity) that nonetheless converges to zero in probability6; (qt/St)t≥0 is a
supermartingale that converges to zero in probability. Consequently, the margin loan
interest rate is a submartingale (always expected to increase) that converges in mean
square to the choke price r∞ = ν − σ2/2, where σ is the annual log-volatility of
the stock market. If the relative size of the money market becomes unexpectedly
large (e.g. due to bad stock market performance), then the margin loan interest rate
may happen to hit zero on its way up to r∞; we found a nice rule of thumb for
bounding the chances of this ever happening (from here to eternity): the probability
is at most 1− (Current Interest Rate÷ Choke Price). Based on numerical solutions
of the differential equations, we observed that this majorant is typically within 3% of
the actual value.
In the same vein, we concluded that the Kelly leverage ratio (bt)t≥0 is a super-
martingale that converges in mean square to 1 : 1; thus, the very success of the
6But not in mean square!
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leveraged investor causes a gradual degradation of the quality of his opportunity set.
This is manifest in the asymptotic distribution of the Kelly gambler’s performance
relative to the a buy-and-hold investor with the same starting capital, e.g. the ran-
dom variable ms-limt→∞[(Vt/V0) ÷ (St/S0)]. In fact, when all feedback effects are
considered, the Kelly gambler no longer beats the market by an exponential factor;
his asymptotic compound growth rate, namely ms-limt→∞[log(Vt/V0)/t], is equal to
the stock market growth rate, ν. The realized money market growth rate log(qt/q0)/t
converges in mean square to r∞.
We demonstrated that the leveraged investor’s relative growth factor (Vt/V0) ÷
(St/S0) is a submartingale (always expected to increase); however, its limiting ex-
pected value is at most 1 + q0/V0. Thus, if the money market starts out on par with
the Kelly bankroll (q0/V0 := 1), then the Kelly gambler cannot expect to achieve any
more than double the final wealth of the equivalent buy-and-hold investor. Simula-
tion studies (using the stylized parameter values (ν, σ) := (0.09, 0.15) for the S&P
500 index) indicate that the asymptotic relative growth factor (which is negatively-
skewed) has a mean of 1.87 and a standard deviation of 0.24; the Kelly Criterion
eventually beat the market in 97.9% of all (100,000) simulations. The greatest final
relative growth factor ever achieved in simulation was was 2.13; in a select few of the
experiments, the gambler blew himself up spectacularly: the empirical minimum final
growth relative was 0.012. Pray that that never happens to you.
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